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In the SupreDie Court of the 
State of Utah 
Pl£ASANT GROVE CITY, 
a municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LAURENCE CREASE and 
RETrA CREASE, his wife; 
RICHARD L. BEZZANT and 
ANGELINlA. BEZZANT, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 7874 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF OASE 
This action was brought by Pleasant Grove City as 
plaintiff, and the follwing defendants: Laurence Crease 
and Retta S. Crease, his wife; Richard L. Bezzant and An-
gelina Bezzant, his wife; S. Duane Harper and Chloe Har-
per, his wife; Ray W. Fenton and La Verda Fenton, his wife; 
Thomas Fenton and Ethel Fenton, his wife; Hoyt Shields 
and Cleone B. Shields, his wife; Paul M. Jones and Marie 
B. Jones, his wife; Edna B. West Yates and Thomas Yates, 
her husband; David F. West; Varian LaVearl West and 
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Mrs. Vlarian LaVearl West, his wife; State Savings & Loan 
Association, a corporation; Bank of Pleasant Grove, a cor-
poration; and State Bank of Lehi, a corporation. 
Defendants were the owners of land abutting along 
the east side and along the west side of the following de-
scribed property: 
·Commencing 32.8 feet West and 31.1 feet South 
of the intersection Monument at Fourth East and Third 
South Streets, Official Plat of Pleasant Grove City 
(Robert L. Wilson Plat) thence South 733.00 feet; 
thence East 66.00 feet; thence North 733.00 feet; thence 
West 66.00 feet to the place of beginning. 
That the defaults of all of the defendants were duly 
entered except Laurence Crease and Retta S. Crease, his 
wife, and Richard L. Bezzant and Angelina Bezzant, his 
wife. 
That all of said defendants received their title to the 
lands abutting on the east side and abutting on the west 
side of the above described lands from the Mayor of Pleas-
ant Grove City. 
That demand has been made upon the defendants that 
they surrender possession of the lands above described to 
the plaintiff (File 4-6). 
That the defendants, Richard L. Bezzant and Angelina 
Bezzant, his wife, filed an Answer and CoWlterclaim on the 
27th day of October, 1950 (File 7-11). 
That the defendants, Laurence rCrease and Retta S. 
Crease, his wife, filed an Answer and ·Counterclaim on the 
27th day of O·ctober, 1950. (File 13-17). 
Replies of the plaintiff were duly made to the Answer 
and Counterclaims of the defendants, Crease and Bezzant 
(File 19-20). 
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3 
That on the 3rd day of July, 1951, a Memorandum De-
ci~on \vas filed (File 21) . 
·· That on the 27th day of August, 1951, the Court made 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (File 22-23). 
The lower court entered judgment in the matter on the 
27th day of AUooust, 1951 (File 33-34). 
The defendants, Crease and Bezzant, filed a Motion 
to Modify Conclusions of Law and Judgment on the 29th 
day of August, 1951 (File 35). 
The plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial on the 6th 
day of September, 1951 File 36). 
On May 21, 1951, the court made its ruling, ·which was 
as follows: 
In this matter the defendants' Motion for a New 
Trial is denied. Plaintiff's Motion to Modify Conclu-
sions and judgment is denied. (File 37). 
On or about the 30th day of June, 1952, the court 
changed its ruling and made the following Order: 
"IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
PLEASANT GROVE CITY, 
a Municipal Corp., 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
LAURENCE CREASE, ET AL, 
Defendants 
MIN{UTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 16,253 
DATED JUNE 30, 1952 
R. L. TUCKETr, Judge 
RULING 
In this matter the Plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial is denied. The Defendants' motion to modify the 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment is denied. 
(Signed) R. L. TUCKE'IT" 
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The defendants appealed from the original incorrect 
order on the 21st day of May, 1952 (File 38). 
The Statement of Points was filed by the defendants on 
the 27th day of June, 1952 (File 41). 
Plaintiff appealed from the Order as set out above on 
or about the 23rd day of July, 1952 (File 43). 
Defendants filed their Cross-Appeal Statement of Points 
by Way Thereof on the 28th day of July, 1952 (File 47-48). 
The defendants and appellants knew that the order they 
appealed from was wrong and incorrect, as they had a copy 
of the same in their office. As soon as the plaintiff and re-
spondent found that the Order was erroneous they appealed 
to the court and he made a corrected Order on the 30th day 
of June, 1952. The plaintiff appealed from this corr~cted 
Order within time, and therefore the appeal was proper. 
Respondents feel that the case should be heard on its 
merits on the appeal of the plaintiffs and the cross-appeal 
of the defendants. The Briefs as sll!bmitted herein should 
be considered, but the case should be heard on its merits 
to the same extent and effect as though the plaintiff's ap-
peal as filed herein was proper and in time. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The property involved in this action is the 2.00 rods 
east of "Lot 2, Block 7, Pleasant Grove City Survey" and 
the 2.00 rods west of "Lot 5, Block 8, Pleasant Grove City 
Survey.'' 
The above property was and is platted as a street, to-
gether with the property owned by the defendants whose 
default has been entered, and connects Third South Street 
and the street running east and west and parallel to the 
said Third South Street and south thereof. 
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The land in dispute is designated as a street on the 
map of Pleasant Grove City, and has been so designated for 
many, many years prior to this action being brought. 
The Bezzants, and their predecessors in interest, re-
ceived title to Lot 2, Block 7, Plat "A" Pleasant Grove City 
Survey. The 2.00 rods east of said Lot 2, Block 7 was not 
included in said deed, but only Lot 2, Block 7, Pleasant 
Grove City Survey, was conveyed. The Creases, and their 
predecessors in interest, received title to Lot 5, Block 8, 
Plat "'A", Pleasant Grove City Survey. The 2.00 rods west 
of said Lot 5 was not includeed in the said deed, but only 
Lot 5, Block 8, Pleasant Grove City Survey. The titles to 
Lot 2, Block 7, and Lot 5, Block 8, were conveyed to the 
predecessors in interest of the said Creases and Bezzants 
by the Mayor of Pleasant Grove City, but not the land in 
dispute. 
On the 2.00 rods claimed by the Creases by adverse 
possession or by estoppel were some improvements. There 
were no improvements on the 2.00 rods claimed by the Bez-
zants, by adverse possession or by estoppel. The Creases' 
home is located on Lot 5, Block 8, and is not located on the 
property in dispute, but is located some feet east of 
there. The Bezzants' home is located on Lot 2, Block 7, 
and is not located on the property in dispute, but is located 
some feet west of there. 
The Fmdings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg-
ment were prepared by the defendants' attorneys, and were 
not submitted to the plaintiff and its attorneys for approval 
before signed by the Judge of the lower court. 
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QUESTION IN DISPUTE 
The question to be decided by this Court is whether or 
not the defendants, through adverse possession or by es-
toppel, can obtain title to property which belonged to Pleas-
ant Grove City, and was platted and designated as a street 
It is admitted that the defendants, and their predeces-
sors in interest, are now in possession of the property and 
have been for many years. 
As a matter of law and equity, should the Court quiet 
the title in the defendants or should the Court have quieted 
title in the plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
1. CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
Appellants contend that since the court found that 
plaintiff city failed to establish its title and that defendants 
were, in possession of property that the court should have 
quieted title in the defendants. 
This assumes that possession only, without any title, 
is sufficient to justify a Decree Quieting Title. 
The effect of the trial court's Findings and Decree re-
fusing to quiet their title and dismissing their ~Counter­
claims, was to determine that they had no title to the prem-
ises. Thus, it having been determined that they had no 
title, it was not in error to refuse to quiet title in them. 
The case of Pender v. Bird, 224 Pac. 2d 1057, cited by 
appellants is distinguishable. In that case the defendant, 
Bird, was in possession and he also had a tax title, both 
from the county and the city, so it having been proved that 
the plaintiff had no title, the defendant was justified in hav-
ing his tax title quieted. 
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The defendants obtained title to Lot 2, Block 7, and 
Lot 5, Block 8, but they did not at any time make any claim 
for the property between said lots, which is the property 
in dispute, and which was platted as a street. 
II. STATUTORY PROVISION1S 
This is not an ordinary action between private parties. 
The law governing such transactions does not apply in this 
particular case. 
This is an action brought by Pleasant Grove City, a 
Municipal Corporation. The title of the defendants is de-
termined by statute. 
The statute is 104-2-13, U.~C.A. 1943, and reads as fo1-
lows: 
"104-2-13. Id. O·F PUBLIC STREETS, ETC. 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right 
or title in or to any lands held by any town, city or 
county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated 
for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks 
or public squares or for any other public purpose, by 
adverse possession thereof for any length of time what-
soever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such 
town or city or county or the corporate authorities have 
sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real 
estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration and 
that for more than seven years subsequent to such 
conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or successors 
in interest, have been in the exclusive, ·continuous and 
adverse possession of such real estate; in which case 
an adverse title may be acquired." 
It will be seen from this statute that no person can 
acquire any right or title in or to any lands held by any 
municipal corporation which has been designated as streets. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
The court found that the defendants had not acquired title 
to the lands of which they were in possession and dismissed 
their counterclaim. In other words, the court by its judg-
ment (File 34) held that the defendants had not acquired 
any title to the property in dispute. This part of the judg-
ment is as follows: 
"2. That plaintiff be, and it is hereby awarded 
judgment of "No Cause of .Nction" on the purported 
cause of action set out in defendants' counterclaim, and 
that said coWlterclaims be, and the same are hereby 
eli "ssed, snu . 
In order to make such a judgment, the court must have 
found that the defendants had not acquired title, for two 
reasons: (1) The Statute was against them, and (2) the 
city was not estopped under the law and equity. 
The note under the statute above quoted states very 
definitely that such a statute had been on our statute books 
since 1876, Chaper 4, Section 1174. Similar provisions have 
been in our statutes sinGe 1867. 
This is supported by the case of Giauque v. Salt Lake 
City, 42 Utah 89, at Page 94, 129 Pac. 429. This matter 
is also discussed in the case of Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 
Utah 593, 168 Pac. 766; Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 
304, 166 Pac. 2d 221; Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 
485, 116 Pac. 2d 406. 
In the last case above mentioned, the defendants 
claimed that the city had deeded them the property, and 
thereby had relinquished any right which the city might 
have had in and to the property. The defendants in this 
case have not claimed at any time that the city deeded them 
the property. The title they had is from other people or 
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they must acquire title to the property by estoppel against 
the city. 
The defendants are not only bound by the statute, but 
they are also bound by the records in this case. They knew 
that they did not have title to the property in dispute. The 
city had the title, and it had not parted with this title to the 
defendants or their predecessors. Their abstract showed 
this and they also knew this from the public records. This 
matter is discussed in 19 Am. Jur. Page 770, Section 116 and 
the cases cited in the notes. 
We have set forth the :facts that show conclusively that 
the defendants do not have title by virtue of any deed is-
sued by the municipality, which fact is definitely established 
by their abstract and the public records. This question is 
discussed very carefully in 19 Am. Jur. Page 603, Sections 
5 to 32 inclusive. 
We think the cases cited by defendants, except as re-
ferred to above, are not in point. The defendants have 
mixed up the right of the defendants with private parties, 
and do not seem to r~cognize that this is an attempt on the 
part of the defendants to establish title to the property as 
against a municipal corporation, to-wit: Pleasant Grove City. 
Appellants cite the case of West v. ·Child, 8 Utah 223, 
and argue that it is, at least by inference, authority for 
the proposition that where one is in the possession of prop-
erty within a townsite prior to entry by the Mayor and con-
tinues to retain possession after entry fur the statutory 
period, that gives him title by adverse possession. This 
case is not in point, and is not authority for such proposi-
tion even by inference, for the reason that in the West case 
the dispnte was between individuals, and the property in-
volved was not platted street property; whereas, in this case, 
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the defendants seek adverse title to such platted street prop-
erty against the city. All the West ·case holds is that one 
in adverse possession of property within a townsite is en-
titled to the benefits of the townsite laws and the Legisla-
tive enactments of the territory passed to carry out the 
terms thereof. 
The Townsite Law of March 2, 1867, and the Legisla-
tive enactments made to carry out the provisions thereof 
gave occupants of land within the townsite the right to, 
and also required of them, that they establish their claims 
through the Probate Court and get deeds to their claimed 
premises from the Mayor or Probate Judge. It also pro-
vided that if said claimants failed to make such ·claims with-
in a certain time, as set out in the law, that their claims 
would be forever barred. 
III. ADVERSE POSSESSION 
The appellants have mixed up adverse possession with 
the question of estoppel in their brief. The law, however, 
is clear that the defendants can gain no title by adverse 
possession as against a municipality. This matter is gov-
erned by the statutes, ·and the statutes have several times 
been construed by our Supreme Court in the cases cited 
above. 
IV. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL OR ESTOPPEL IN PAIS 
The only ground on which the defendants could 
claim title would be on the ground of equitable estoppel or 
estoppel in pais. It seems from the brief of the appellants 
that this is the ground on which they claim title to the 
property. They have devoted practi:eally sixteen pages of 
their brief to this question. 
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Equitable estoppel is defined by 21 Corpus Juris, Sec-
tion 116, Page 1113, as follows: 
"Equitable estoppel is sometimes called Estoppel 
in Pais Estoppel by Representation or Estoppel by c:on-
duct. It is defined as the effect of the voluntary eon-
duct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, 
both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which 
might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of prop-
erty, of contract, or of remedy, as against another per-
son who in good faith relied upon such conduct, and 
has been led thereby to change his position for the 
worse, and who on 'his part acquires some correspond-
ing right, either of contract or of remedy. This es-
toppel arises when one by his acts, representations or 
admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak 
out, intentionally or through culpable negligence in-
duces another to believe certain facts to exist and such 
other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that 
he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny 
the existence of such facts. It consists in ·holding for 
truth a representation acted upon when the person who 
made it seeks to deny its truth." 
This is also discussed in 19 Am. Jur. Sections 33, 34 
and 35, Page 633-636. 
It will be observed that the essential elements of equi-
table estoppel or estoppel in pais ars as follows: 
(1) There must exist a false representation or con-
cealment of material facts. 
(2) Such representation must have been made with 
knowledge actual or constructive of the facts. 
(3) The party to whom it was made must have been 
without knowledge or the means of knowledge 
of the real facts. 
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( 4) It must have been made with the intention that 
it should be acted upon, and the party to whom 
it was made must have relied on it or acted upon 
it to his prejudice. 
This is discussed in 21 C. J., Section 122, Page 1119; 
also in 19 Am. Jur., Sections 42 to 52. 
IMPROVEMENTS 
The defendants, and their predecessors in interest, hav-
ing known that they did not have title to the disputed area, 
made no permanent improvements thereon, and any im-
provements they have made was voluntary on their part, 
knowing as they did know at the time that they did not 
have title to the disputed property. The defendants, and 
their predecessors in ~interest, did not build any homes on 
the disputed area, but it seems that they did make some· 
improvements, especially on the 2.00 rods west of Lot 5, 
Block 8. Therefore, the homes they built were built with 
full knowledge that they did not have title to the disputed 
area. Any improvements placed on the disputed area were 
placed there voluntarily and with the knowledge that they 
did not have title. thereto. These improvements are minor 
and do not consist of any substantial buildings, but consist 
mainly of barns and chicken coops. These improvements 
can easily be moved onto property to ·which the defendants, 
and their predecessors in interest have title. This is dis-
cussed in 21 C. J. Section 197, Page 1197 and notes. This 
section cites the Wall case herein referred to, and reads as 
follows: 
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''ACQUIESCENCE IN IMPRO·V!EMENTS 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked 
against the public, a municipality or other public agen-
cy, where it has acquiesced in the making on its streets 
by one acting in good faith or such valuable and per-
manent improvements that it would be unjust and in-
equitable to allow it to assert title to the property on 
which the improvements were made. However, to cre-
ate an estoppel the essential elements of an estoppel 
in pais must be present. It is essential that the im-
provements should have been induced by the aots of 
the municipality, and it has been held that a claim of 
irrevocable right in a street or public place cannot be 
predicated upon the ground alone that the public offi-
cers saw improvements in course of construction and 
did not object. Something more than mere possession 
of municipal property on the part of private parties 
must be shown. Improvements of a ·trivial or insig-
nificant character cannot be made the basis of an es-
toppel.'' 
TAXES 
The question of collection of general taxes which is 
discussed in 21 C. J. Section 198, Page 1199 reads as fol-
lows: 
"It is generally held that a state or municipality 
is not estopped from subsequently claiming title to prop-
erty for the benefit of the public, by an unauthorized . 
levy and collection of taxes on such property, or even 
by a levy and sale of such property for taxes. So also 
unauthorized assessment for public improvements will 
not estop the municipality from setting up a claim of 
title to the land against which the assessments were 
made.'' 
A California case, Gervasoni vs. City of Petaluma, 189 
Cal. 306, 208 Pac. 120, holds that assessment and collection 
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of taxes by a city on certain lands does not estop the city 
from later claiming such assessed land to be a street. 
A Colorado case, Eisenhart v. City & c·ounty of Den-
ver, 150 Pac. 729, reaffirmed 170 Pac. 1179, holds that in 
a suit against the city to recover lands, the fact that such 
lands had been taxed did not estop the city from claiming 
title for the benefit of the public. 
To the same effect is Hecker v. City & Co·unty of Den-
ver, 252 Pac. 808. 
On this question of assessment of taxes many cases 
are authority for rthe view that acts of the taxing officials, 
even if they are officers of the city, in assessing or collect-
ing taxes upon premises that actually constitute a street, 
although privately claimed and occupied, are beyond their 
authority and jurisdiction, and cannot bind the city nor es-
top it from asserting its right to claim and open such street. 
Collins v. Wayland, 59 Arizona 340, 127 Pac. 2d 
716. 
Boise City vs. Han, 14 Idaho 272; 94 Pac. 167. 
Plumb v. Grand Rapids, 81 Michigan 381; 45 N.W. 
1024. 
In the latter case the court pointed out that under the 
law all assessments and even the sale of the property in 
question for taxes were absolutely void if title ·was in the 
city~ since no taxing . officer could lawfully subject the city 
property to sale for taxation. This ease involved a special 
improvement assessment made by the city. Our Pleasant 
Grove Cirty case involves only general property taxes which, 
as the Court knows, were actually assessed by the county 
officials. The reason these lands now in dispute were as-
sessed by the county against the defendants was that these 
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defendants placed on record deeds and conveyances which 
included a description of the street property, although they 
actually had no legal title to the same. This clearly ap-
pears from their two abstracts placed in evidence. In other 
words, the taxes were assessed and paid by them pursuant 
to their own acts. What actually happened, as is well 
known, was that each year the city determined lts !"ate of 
tax or tax levy and this was certified to the county offi-
cials, who then applied the levy to all taxable property with-
in the city limits. There is no finding whatever that Pleas-
ant Grove City took any affirmative action leading directly 
or indirectly to the levy of taxes on this particular property 
on which defendants could or had any right to rely _or on 
\Vhich they in fact did rely. 
The following cases have been decided by the Supreme 
Court, and we think are in point, and should be read and 
studied by this Court in order to determine the relationship 
of the city to this property and the rights of the defendants 
to have this Court determine that they have title to the 
disputed area. The cases are as follows: 
Wall vs. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593; 168 Pac. 766. 
Tooele City v. Elkington, 116 Pac. 2d. 406. 
Hall v. North Ogden City, 166 Fac. 2d 221. 
There is one federal case which we think would throw 
some light on the subject before this ~court, and, therefore, 
we refer to it because we think it will benefit the Court in 
arriving at a proper decision in this matter. This case is: 
Provo City vs. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad ~Company, 
156 Fed 2d 710, rendered in ·Circuit ~Court of Appeals for 
lOth Circuit and in which Writ of ,Certiorari was denied ·by 
the U. S. Supreme Court. 
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In reading these cases, we are sure the Court will find 
that the facts in the case of Pleasant Grove City are en-
tirely different and do not meet the requirments of an equi-
table estoppel against the city, and therefore the defend-
ants should not prevail in their appeal. 
We quote from the Federal Court case, which stated 
as follows: 
"These three cases (referring to the Wall v. Salt 
Lake City, Tooele City v. Elkington, and Hall v. North 
Ogden City) considered in their composite effect seem 
to make it clear that in Utah, the principle of estoppel 
in pais is to be applied very narrowly to a city in re-
spect of its right to re-open a street for use as a pub-
lic thoroughfare, and only in cases where the city acted 
within the ambit of its legal authority but in an irregu-
lar way." 
We are certain that the Provo City case presents a 
much stronger rule for estoppel in pais than the Pleasant 
Grove City case, now before this ~Court. There is nothing 
in the brief of the appellants or in the case itself to indi-
cate that the city has taken any action whatever regarding 
the property in dispute. It has, of course, accepted geneml 
taxes, but these have been levied by the ·county and paid 
in bulk to the city, and the city did not have any knowledge 
whatsoever that this particular piece of property was be-
ing assessed. 
The disputed area could not be assessed, under the law, 
and therefore any assessment of a general tax is void as 
against the city. 
The ground upon which the appellant can therefore 
rely is upon adverse possession, and this does not operate 
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against a city, regardless of how long adverse possession 
may continue. 
CONCLUSION 
A private individual, under our statutes, and under the, 
laws as established by the courts, can obtain title against 
a municipality only in two ways: 
(1) Deed from the city. 
(2) Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais. 
It is evident from the appellants' brief and pleadings 
and cases cited herein that the defendants do not and can-
not claim title by either one of the two methods set forth 
above. 
It is, therefore, the contention of respondent that the 
appellants cannot prevail in this action, and the decision 
of this Court should be against the appellants, and each of 
them, and in favor of the respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. ALBERT PAGE 
I. E. BROCKBANK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
First Security Bank Building 
Provo, Utah 
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